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Abstract 
In order to examine the implications different forms and degrees of 
internationalised constitution making have on ideas of statehood and the legitimacy 
of a constitution, the study compares two cases—South Sudan and Somaliland—to 
explore contrasting patterns of international involvement in constitution making. 
South Sudan is the one ‘extreme’ case with strong international intervention, with 
Somaliland at the other ‘extreme’. This paper demonstrates that the actual process 
matters and once again reinforces scepticism about the ways in which 
internationalised constitution making is conducted in war-torn settings. In 
Somaliland the societal consensus production, which included negotiating a 
governmental structure, was in the hands of the local elites for the constitution-
making period, which lasted a decade. In South Sudan the consensus production has 
so far been framed and guided by powerful international actors who had a seat at 
the local negotiating table. Not only does path dependence seem to prevent the 
production of a broader consensus on the mode of statehood, but the local 
translations of international ‘models’ also seem to be contrary to intended Rule of 
Law ideas. The study indicates that even though a locally driven and owned process 
supports the production of a legitimate constitution, international support is not 
generally denied. Inherent tensions between ‘local ownership’ and ‘external 
intervention’ may open space for re-negotiations on different normative perceptions 
and may support a redefinition of exclusion/inclusion dynamics. Nevertheless, to 
avoid these tensions becoming un-negotiable as a result of the imposition of 
international assistance which may lead to international ‘models’ simply being 
rejected or manipulated in line with internal power relations, constitution making 
needs to be conducted in an open manner by the local actors themselves.  
Keywords  
Constitution making, Rule of Law, South Sudan, Somaliland 
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Involvement and Impact of External Actors on 
Constitution Making in South Sudan and 
Somaliland: A Comparative Study*  
Katrin Seidel 
I Introduction 
Even though external actors have influenced the making of constitutions 
throughout history1, in the last two decades, the increased international 
interventions during and after violent civil and intra-state conflicts have often been 
extended to constitution building.2 In the wake of conflict or in attempts to 
anticipate violent conflict resolution, drafting a new constitution seems to have 
become imperative to (re-)establishing the basis of state legitimacy. The idea is to 
develop and build a political community, premised on the drawing up of rules for 
the allocation, accountability, and exercise of power. The post-cold-war 
experiences are shaped by the universalisation of certain ideas of statehood and an 
enormous rise in international organisations, regulations and fora3 whereby 
constitution making is used as a state-making tool4 within broader ‘rule of law’ 
(RoL) frameworks5. This recent surge of international involvement has not only 
changed ‘traditional’ ways of constitution making, but has also created ‘a veritable 
industry […] whereby constitutional technicity – exemplified in the provision of 
technical expertise – has become a central feature of contemporary constitution-
making practice’6.  
                                                          
 * I would like to thank the Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre of Global Cooperation Research and 
the Department ‘Law and Anthropology’ at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology 
for supporting and funding this research project. I further want to express my gratitude to 
Marie-Claire Foblets, Klaus Schlichte, Frank Gadinger, Markus Böckenförde, Markus Hoehne, 
Timm Sureau, Boris Jarosch and Mike Tredway for their advice and suggestions on the paper; 
and to the KHK/GCR21 Research Colloquium participants for their comments on an early 
version of the paper, particularly to Christof Hartmann. Many thanks also for the 
comprehensive editorial support. 
 1 Schauer 2004: 901ff. 
 2 The vague term ‘international actors’ comprises individual activists and academics, individuals 
and groupings of states, (supra-)regional institutions, non-local NGOs, commercial 
enterprises, research institutions/think tanks, etc. 
 3 Schneckener 2016: 2. 
 4 Ludsin 2011: 242f; Hay 2014: 141–68; Turner et al. 2015; Wolfrum 2005: 649ff; Chesterman 
2004; von Bogdandy et al. 2005: 579ff; Choudhry 2005: 933–45; Dann and Al-Ali 2006: 424, 
Narten 2008. 
 5 May 2014b; Humphreys 2010; Costa and Zolo 2007; Carothers 1998: 95–106. 
 6 Kendall 2013: 2–3. 
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Since constitution-making processes are supposed to be guided by the respective 
socio-historical experiences, taking into account the perceptions, emotions and 
hopes of the people7, the research assumption is that the ‘making’ itself opens up 
space and fora for continuously re-negotiating statehood and plurality. In order to 
examine the implications that different forms and degrees of internationalised 
constitution making8 have on ideas of statehood and (constitutional) legitimacy, 
this paper compares two ‘polar types’9. To explore contrasting patterns of 
international involvement in constitution making, South Sudan is the one ‘extreme’ 
case with strong international intervention, and Somaliland is the other ‘extreme’ 
case in which a similar intervention is almost completely lacking.  
The similarities between South Sudan’s and Somaliland’s constitution making are 
manifold: both countries are geographically and socio-historically part of the 
broader Horn of Africa region. They are characterised by coexisting, intertwined 
normative orders10. Local laws11 with various perceptions of loyalty, authority and 
conflict resolution mechanisms are the predominant normative tools to regulate 
social interactions. Moreover, after decisive and long armed struggles, both regions 
seceded from their respective unities, specifically from Sudan and from Somalia. 
Accordingly, there were, respectively are changing patterns of violent and non-
violent negotiations on the mode of statehood affecting the debates on a 
constitution in both emerging states. The constitution-making processes are 
neither institutionalised as stable procedures nor clearly defined spaces of action 
among well-defined bodies of participating actors. In an attempt to create the 
fiction of a ‘territorial modern nation state’12, constitution making in both emerging 
states has revolved around the construction of sovereignties in an attempt to 
control territorial borders, to more clearly define an interior space and to convince 
the people that this interior space does exist. Elites therefore negotiate the scope 
of state institutions with multiple governance authorities at different levels. 
Constitution making thus becomes a way of negotiating the state’s functions and 
mainly takes place among the political leaders themselves13. The common 
openness of negotiations and the socio-historical and geographical parallels 
provide many opportunities to compare and distinguish the negotiation of modes 
of statehood. 
With regard to the differences between the two chosen cases, the constitution-
making process is still ongoing in South Sudan whereas the Somaliland process is a 
retrospective or ‘settled’ case since the Somaliland constitution was adopted in 
                                                          
 7 Fombad 2007: 32. 
 8 See Hay 2014: 142ff; Dann and Al-Ali 2006: 426f. 
 9 Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007: 25–32.  
 10 A normative order can be defined as ‘a body of interrelated norms, or of rules and principles’ 
(Woodman 2011: 10). 
 11 Local law refers to the different normative orders of South Sudan’s and Somaliland’s local 
communities. It can be understood as one of the various forms of—according to C. Geertz 
(1983)—local knowledge. 
 12 The territorial modern state has become the only valid state order system. Even though the 
idea of the state has been attributed with different meanings, the notions of territoriality 
(borders), internal and external sovereignty, and the state as a body of administrative 
institutions seem to prevail (Schlichte 2004: 150f). 
 13 See Tushnet 2008. 
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2001. Combining retrospective and real-time cases allows for mitigating ‘biased 
data’14. One of the major distinctive features is that only South Sudan has gained 
international recognition. South Sudan was recognised as a sovereign state by the 
United Nations15 only a few days after declaring its independence from the 
Republic of the Sudan on 9 July 2011. Somaliland self-declared its independence 
from Somalia in May 199116. However, international recognition as a sovereign 
state has been granted neither by the United Nations, by the African Union, nor by 
any other supra-national structure. ‘Its legal status poses an enigma as it seeks 
independence while the international community continues to align itself with the 
orthodox position, which is in support of the territorial integrity of Somalia’17. The 
denial of international recognition has created ‘a barrier to potential foreign direct 
investment’18 and has severe implications for Somaliland’s participation in receiving 
international ‘state-building assistance’. However, unlike the constitution-making 
efforts in the de jure sovereign oil-rich South Sudan, where there is immense 
international support for building both the state and the constitution, constitution 
making in the de facto independent Republic of Somaliland seems to be one of the 
rare cases of a locally led process.  
In order to grasp the international dimension of constitution making in both 
cases, it is necessary to consider that this process takes place within a universe of 
plurality of co-existing and co-constituting normative orders19 that are generated 
through constant (re-)negotiations, recognition, determinations and are utilised by 
complex actor constellations, with different sources of legitimacy20. Moreover, 
since normative ideas travel around the globe, their content changes constantly, 
but they in turn also change the institutional frames and legal cultures into which 
they are translated. Therefore, translation21 is chosen as an analytical lens. An 
important part of translation is constructing a frame which can have powerful 
effects on the way situations are understood and on the tactics their supporters 
deploy. Framing goes along with transplanting efforts. Transplants are models22 
adapted from one local context to another, often in unexpected ways, whereby 
each translation is part of a ‘translation chain’23. Frames are not only translated into 
new contexts, but they retain their underlying emphasis on certain legal notions 
embedded in the legal codes of the international legal system. Identifying 
                                                          
 14 Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007: 28. 
 15 The UN General Assembly of 14 July 2011 approved the UN Security Council Resolution 
S/RES/1999 (2011), recognising South Sudan as the 54th African state and admitting it as 193rd 
Full Member to the United Nations; Ki-moon 2013. 
 16 Resolution from Burao Elders Meeting 5 May 1991, in: APD 2008: 90. 
 17 Osman 2013: 49. 
 18 Ibid.: 51. 
 19 See Schiff Berman 2012. 
 20 Von Benda-Beckmann et al. 2009: 1–30. 
 21 Translation can be understood as the process of adjusting the rhetoric and structure of legal 
interventions to local circumstances (see comprehensively Merry 2006: 265–302; Shimada 
2006: 83–95; Bachmann-Medick 2012: 331–59; Behrends et al. 2014). 
 22 A model can be understood as ‘an analytical representation of particular aspects of reality 
created as apparatus of protocol for interventions to shape this reality for certain purposes’ 
(see Behrends et al. 2014: 1–2). 
 23 Ibid.; Rottenburg 2009. 
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‘translators’ and ‘technologies of governance’ they help to establish, their specific 
interests, motives, preferences and their impact allows an analysis of power 
relations which are understood as processes of negotiation between different 
frames of references among actors. Moreover, (legal) knowledge transfer seems to 
be highly supported by pre-defined modules, templates and taxonomies. 
Translation allows for a thick comparison24, because it does not lose sight of the 
idiosyncrasies of each locale under study. It allows a comparison of the way in 
which (inter)national legal norms are appropriated and translated into different 
local normative orders. In order to deal with the difficulties of comparing different 
contexts which are embedded in and shaped by specific local socio-political and 
historical dynamics as well as by global politics, a comparison must be ‘based in the 
logic of encounter’25. Each case ‘stands on its own as analytic unit’26.  
Local contexts are taken as the comparative starting point from a legal plural 
perspective in order to trace the respective constitution-making processes. By 
taking a concrete perspective of the making of constitutions as an exploratory 
epistemological strategy, attention is drawn to what is happening at concrete 
negotiation tables and in negotiation arenas27 where different normative doctrines, 
institutions and practices are re-negotiated, and social and legal hierarchies28 are 
constituted. In order to grasp the major negotiating dynamics within respective 
processes, ‘critical moments in the process that led to a change in the course of the 
negotiation[s]’29 are identified. These ‘turning points’30 not only set new 
negotiation patterns in motion, but can also unveil the actual ‘ownership’31. It is 
therefore necessary to identify ‘a clear and self-evident change from earlier events 
or patterns in the form of a decision taken by one or all parties’32 which leads to an 
alteration in direction taken by the negotiation process.  
The two case studies will be explored through the collected empirical data with 
their own respective dynamics. The aim is to shed new light on the constitution-
making processes at stake based on fieldworks in both countries33 as well as 
qualitative content analysis of written materials such as official legal documents, 
protocols, records and local newspaper, academic articles, etc. Oral interviews have 
been conducted for the same purpose with numerous (institutional) actors who 
                                                          
 24 Following C. Geertz’s ‘thick description‘. 
 25 Freeman and Mangez 2013: 204. 
 26 Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007: 25. 
 27 A negotiation table can be defined as ‘a formalized setting where contending social groups 
decide upon key aspects of statehood over a given period of time’, governed by particular 
conventions and formalities that entail mutual recognition among the participants. A 
negotiation arena is non-formalized settings of negotiation and ‘represents the broader 
political space in which relations of power and authority are vested’ (Hagmann and Péclard 
2010: 551); as such, options of action are not bound to certain types of behaviour, and may 
include both non-violent and violent practices (Kapferer and Taylor 2012: 4; ibid. 2005: x). 
 28 Von Benda-Beckmann 2014: 4. 
 29 Crump and Druckman 2016: 6. 
 30 Ibid. 
 31 The catch-all concept of ‘intellectual’ ownership is widely understood as ‘the extent to which 
domestic actors control both the design and implication of political processes’ (Donais 2009: 5). 
 32 Crump and Druckman 2016: 7. 
 33 South Sudan (05/2011, 04–06/2013, 04–06/2015); Somaliland (10–11/2015). 
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narrate their respective experiences of constitution making from different 
perspectives as well as participant observations in order to achieve a ‘thick 
translation’34 or thick comparison. This method ‘entail[s] a more or less explicit 
acknowledgement that what can be learned from one case is not necessarily 
comparable with what can be learned from another’, even though ‘comparison 
zones’ in the sense of ‘open space’ or ‘a white page, an area or arena of reflection’ 
may be developed in order to construct a ‘post-comparative perspective’35.  
This paper will therefore address the following questions:  
 How are international ‘models’ appropriated, adapted and transformed 
by the actors involved?  
 What role does the process itself play with regard to exclusion and 
inclusion dynamics at different stages of constitution making?  
 To what extent does ‘external’ involvement contribute to ideas of 
cohesion, certainty and stabilised governance?  
This paper basically reveals that strong external interventions in the constitution-
making process is not a necessary condition and instead is of only limited use for 
the emergence of a local legitimate political order. As will be demonstrated, 
translation dynamics are basically controlled by local political dynamics. 
Accordingly, attempts to produce a constitution out of pre-defined international 
concepts, modules and templates are deceptive and the translation results are 
often contrary to intended ideas of Rule of Law. In light of local translation 
processes, the de facto influence of well-intended international interventions 
seems to be rather limited and the chosen intervention methods counter-
productive. 
II The Framing: Constitution making as corner stone of Rule 
of Law promotion 
The Rule of Law seems to have not only become ‘the dominant paradigm for state 
governance in the international arena’36, but also ‘the Grundnorm of a new 
constitutionalism’37. It has become the ‘basic grammar of constitutionalism’38, 
structuring the politico-legal discourses and the ‘use of concepts like people, self-
government, citizen, rights, equality, nation, and popular sovereignty’.39  
                                                          
 34 Hermans 2003: 380–9; Appiah 1993: 808–19. 
 35 Freeman and Mangez 2013: 202. 
 36  Grenfell 2013.  
 37 May 2014a: 63–76.  
 38 Key elements of the constitutionalism grammar have become amongst others the recognition 
of civil, political and economic rights and freedoms, the separation of powers, an independent 
judiciary, the review of the constitutionality of laws, the control of the amendment of the 
constitution, and institutions that support democracy (Fombad 2011: 1014f; Akiba 2004: 6). 
 39 Maldonado 2012: 1. 
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The Rule of Law is a packed idea that produces a joint belief and persuades and 
defines strategies of collective action40. The framing is reaffirmed, e.g. in the UN 
Resolution on Rule of Law: ‘We are convinced that good governance at the 
international level is fundamental for strengthening the rule of law’.41 Hence, it 
‘socialise[s] elites and legislators into the Rule of Law mind-set’42 whereby 
enormous normative transfers take place43: including constitutions and institutions. 
Due to many unintended implementation effects in practice, the huge gap between 
RoL promises and effects has led to a certain self-reflexivity by international actors. 
The 2004 UN Report on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post 
Conflict already states:  
[…] too often, the emphasis has been on foreign experts, foreign 
models and foreign-conceived solutions to the detriment of durable 
improvements and sustainable capacity […] We must learn better 
how to respect and support local ownership, local leadership.44 
A sub-frame is the catch-all concept of ‘intellectual’ ownership which has 
emerged within the debate on development assistance since the 1990s: ‘The 
common people in “post conflict” or “war-torn”45 societies are […] expected to 
participate, to be consulted and have their say on the formulation of new 
constitutional frameworks […] in order to be successfully implemented’.46 The 
contested concept of ‘local ownership’47 includes both, in the narrow sense, the 
national government and its institutions and, in the broader sense, a form of 
popular participation.48 There has also been a slight observable shift in recent years 
in the international conceptualisation of RoL: consideration has been given to legal 
pluralism dynamics49. An expression of more participatory constitution making is 
that ‘stakeholders’ are not limited to state actors but increasingly include so called 
non-state actors. In addition to the recognition of normative diversity, most RoL 
narratives are connected through the belief that RoL has universal qualities that 
makes it stand apart ‘as a non-ideological, even technical solution’50. Critical 
comments point out that even though ‘ownership’ has become sine qua non for 
international involvement51, it has not been translated into a ‘de facto self-
                                                          
 40 Merry 2006.  
 41 UN Resolution on Rule of Law at the National and International Levels 2012, A/RES/68/116. 
 42 May 2014a: 75. 
 43 See Rajagopal 2008: 1347f; Kendall 2013: 9f.  
 44 S/2004/616. 
 45 Even though the phrases ‘post-conflict’ and ‘war-torn' are often used interchangeably, in this 
paper the latter is used to emphasise the emerging character of the ‘states’ under study 
where violent and non-violent modes of re-negotiation of statehood are ongoing.   
 46 Sannerholm 2012: 124. 
 47 See comprehensively Bargués-Pedreny 2015. 
 48 Sannerholm 2012: 121–2. 
 49 Grenfell 2013: 7. 
 50 Carothers 1998: 99; Rajagopal 2008.  
 51  See also Seidel 2015. 
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determination or self-government’52 due to tensions between international 
regulations and the concept.  
Moreover, not only does the constant affirmation of Rule of Law seem to be a key 
governance technology to cultivate the Grundnorm, but other powerful tools are 
required to legitimise and sustain the paradigm towards the ideal of liberal 
democracy and capitalist market logic: taxonomies of social phenomena. These 
globally circulating knowledge technologies are supposed to support the 
production of ‘legitimacy’ and funding possibilities. They are ‘used to quantify, 
compare, and rank virtually any complex field of human affairs’53. However, even 
though they are presented as facts, indicators ‘are not neutral representations, but 
novel epistemic objects of regulation, domination, experimentation’.54 These 
hegemonic positions are not only hidden in numbers and statistics, but: 
[…] all sorts of words [have] to be invented to express the gap 
between actual practice and the ideal. Terms, such as […] weak 
states, [imply] that the way things really work are somehow 
exogenous to the normative model […]. For non-European states, the 
danger is that the one measure, the ideal-type state drawn from 
European experience, creates a hierarchy in which those farthest 
from the ideal-type are lowest in the hierarchy.55  
As South Sudan and Somalia are farthest from the European ideal-type, accounts 
such as the ‘Fragile States Index 2016’ have classified them as the two worst 
performers. South Sudan is leading the ‘extremely fragile’ states56 after 
presupposing fixed arrangements of statehood such as a collective identity, an 
agreed territory and a monopoly of power. These are, in fact, not universally given 
and can therefore not be presupposed, certainly not in emerging South Sudan. 
Moreover, since Somaliland is internationally perceived as a sub-national entity of 
Somalia, it is not part of the ranking system, but is reflected as part of the second 
worst performer, Somalia. Similarly, according to the regional ‘Ibrahim Index of 
African Governance: Rule of Law 2015’, Somalia and South Sudan are at the top of 
the ‘worst performers’57, based on the ideal-typical RoL-categories. Other 
taxonomies such as the ‘Rule of Law Index’ of The World Justice Project have 
excluded both countries due to lack of data.58 Thus, these taxonomies indicate that 
the global templates are fundamentally mis-conceptualised and often have not 
much in common with the realities on the ground.  
This study takes a closer look at the ‘realities’ through the lens of constitution 
making, particularly as the application of the above taxonomies is cultivated 
through a ‘professionalization of global politics and the deployments of 
                                                          
 52 Bargués-Pedreny 2015: 20. 
 53 Rottenburg and Merry 2015. 
 54 Ibid.  
 55 Migdal and Schlichte 2005: 11. 
 56 See Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy 2016. 
 57 Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2015.  
 58 See World Justice Project 2015. 
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programmes’59 through which specific notions of law are promoted. Competing 
international RoL actors promote their tools as a solution to problems of order and 
are eager to support war-torn countries’ transition to a ‘modern’ democratic state.  
A cornerstone of the promotion of rule of law appears to be the spreading of a 
specific scheme of constitutionalism60. When taking a closer look at constitution 
making prevalent in Africa since the 1990s, the proclaimed so called ‘third wave of 
constitutionalism’61 seems to have opened up political space for new 
experimentation62 under the banner of ‘democratic development’. The endeavours 
seem to follow the problematic logic that the ‘adoption of the appropriate 
constitution is sine qua non [not only] for development,’63 but also for ‘credibility 
with external donors.’64 This belief inherently narrows down constitutional 
pluralism since it does not take sufficient account of the legal pluralist realities, 
despite its claim of ‘accommodating diversity’.  
External constitution-making assistance is primarily provided to governmental 
actors in the form of technical support and legal advisory services by various 
experts65. National actors are caught between competing international participants 
and often in a dilemma when choosing between a multitude of well-meaning 
offers.66 The services offered come with a range of international benchmarks and 
tool-boxed conflict-resolution mechanisms67, interwoven with multi-layered 
premises and interests. Recent experiences show that the more severely 
constitution making in war-torn settings relies on international funding, the greater 
the inherent tensions between the different agendas and interests of external 
actors and objectives of national actors, accompanied by a varying mix of normative 
orders and political imperatives which have severe processual and substantive 
implications68. Consequently, the ‘clients attempt to entrench offered RoL schemes 
into already pre-modelled constitutional frames in the hope of shoring up 
international legitimacy but also in the hope [that] over time [RoL] becomes fused 
with local legal cultures’69. Those model constitutional frameworks create 
‘procedural objectivities’70. However, the ‘production’ of constitutions poses de 
facto severe challenges, e.g. ‘the interaction among the plurality of factors of 
production (political history, legal plural setting), processes (legitimacy, legality), 
quality of products (implementation), and marketing (coordination with inter-/ 
transnational law, local law) as well as customers’ satisfaction (“good practice of 
democracy”)’.71 Empirical evidence has shown that the offered assistance, the 
                                                          
 59 May 2014a: 75. 
 60 Frankenberg 2013: 1; Toniatti 2013. 
 61 Akiba 2004: 9. 
 62 Ibid.: 9. 
 63 Adelman 1998: 78. 
 64 Fombad 2007: 3. 
 65 See Kendall 2013: 1–15. 
 66 IDEA 2011: 15. 
 67 Eriksson and Kostic ́ 2013: 6; Sannerholm 2012: 103f; Humphreys 2010: 7ff; Kendall 2013: 9f. 
 68 Dann and Al-Ali 2006. 
 69 Grenfell 2013: 13. 
 70 Rottenburg 2009: 140. 
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production mode as well as the undue pressure not only fail to achieve what they 
are promise, they create instead what they want to avoid: ‘a poor governance 
framework; weakening human rights protections, entrenching societal divisions; 
delegitimizing the new constitution’72. 
III Rule of Law in Translation: Constitution making in 
emerging South Sudan  
When South Sudan declared its independence from the Republic of Sudan on 9 
July 2011, President Salva Kiir Mayardit held up an oversized reddish book as a 
symbol of the new state: the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South 
Sudan (TCRSS)73. This book symbolises independence and currently serves as the 
pre-modelled normative frame of the new state. The makings of both the TCRSS 
(which is itself based on the pre-modelled Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), 
specifically the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, 2005)74 and the upcoming 
‘permanent’ constitution show that many actors have been excluded from the 
decision-making process. The constitution-making negotiations seem primarily to 
be conducted by the ruling national elites and international actors75.  
1 Making the Transitional Constitution 
The adoption of the TCRSS by the South Sudan parliament was pushed through 
only three days before the declaration of independence in order to ensure that this 
CPA-pre-modelled document could serve as a preliminary normative frame for the 
emerging state. This happened despite the many unsolved basic issues such as the 
system of governance, distribution of state functions, federal and state powers, 
etc. During a final seven-hour legislative debate at the negotiation table, many 
members of parliament (MPs) complained about the haste with which the draft was 
negotiated behind closed doors. The TCRSS draft was even referred to polemically 
as the ‘SPLM constitution’.76 Concerned MPs were reassured that full participation 
in and discussion of all contentious issues would be constitutionally guaranteed by 
the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC) and subsequently by the 
                                                          
 72 Ludsin 2011: 310. 
 73 The TCRSS is based on the Interim National Constitution for the Republic of Sudan 2005 
whose substance was by and large predetermined through the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (see Dann and Al-Ali 2006: 447–9). 
 74 The CPA of 2005 sought to end the decades-long civil war. The CPA can be regarded as a 
fundamental ‘turning point’ within the negotiations between the Sudanese government and 
the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and paved not only the way for the ‘declaration of 
independence’ but the attached IC can be seen as the starting point for South Sudanese 
constitution making. This paper’s scope is limited to the post-2011 constitution making (see 
Johnson 2011; Wassara 2009; Grawert 2010).  
 75 See also Seidel 2015. 
 76 Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly (2001), The Transitional Constitution of South Sudan. 
Ordinary Sitting no. 25, Second Session on 6 July 2011, Juba (recording provided by NLA on 
02.05.2013). 
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National Constitutional Conference (NCC).77 The TCRSS outlines the process of how 
to achieve the proclaimed goal of ‘providing emerging South Sudan with a people 
driven constitution’78. 
The making of the TCRSS had been controlled by a Technical Committee to Review 
the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan. The participants at this negotiation 
table were appointed by the president and comprised of a two third majority of the 
ruling party, Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).79 Accordingly, the 
presidentially hand-picked committee quickly reviewed the interim arrangements 
and—behind closed doors—granted the president hyper-powers to deal with war-
torn political and military fragmentation. The remaining third of the committee 
members perceived their participation as being reduced to a ‘rubber stamp’ 
function.80 The adoption of the TCRSS can be seen as a crucial ‘turning point’ in the 
negotiations on a South Sudanese constitution since numerous contested issues 
already inscribed here not only postpone further negotiation to the ‘permanent’ 
constitution, but the president was granted the authority to use the TCRSS as a 
power instrument handed over by the parliament and made by the Technical 
Committee. This has limited the space for negotiations on the fundamental choices 
regarding the political design of South Sudan. 
2 Making a ‘Permanent’ Constitution: The National Constitutional Review 
 Commission 
Shortly after the adoption of the TCRSS, another negotiation table was set-up by 
presidential decrees81: the 54-members National Constitutional Review Commission 
(NCRC) was mandated with drafting a ‘permanent’ constitution, initially within two 
years82. The South Sudan Civil Society Alliance, an umbrella organisation of more 
than two hundred of South Sudan’s civil society organisations, successfully fought 
for at least a voice in the NCRC.83 A closer look at the composition of the NCRC, 
however, reveals that forty-three of its members represent political parties of 
which twenty-six were appointed by the SPLM.84 As was the case for the TCRSS 
drafting, the ruling political party and its alliances carved out a privileged position 
for themselves in the negotiation of the political leeway necessary to assert 
significant control over the constitution making. Being relegated to a second tier of 
                                                          
 77 A National Constitutional Conference is to deliberate on the NCRC draft. Subsequently, ‘the 
President shall deliberate and adopt’ (Art. 203 TCRSS).  
 78 Art. 202–3 TCRSS. 
 79 Seidel and Moritz 2011: 92. 
 80 Interview with Gabriel Nehemiah Aciek, Juba University, Juba, 14.04.2013. 
 81 Government of South Sudan (GoSS): Presidential Decrees: RSS/PD/J/02/2012, 21.01.2011; 
RSS/PD/03/2012, 09.01.2012; RSS/PD/J/09/20212, 29.02.2012; RSS/PD/J/36/2012, 
28.05.2012. 
 82 The intention was to complete the constitution-making process by 2015. In light of the 
current political and military re-negotiations in South Sudan the making of the ‘permanent’ 
constitution has now been extended to 2018. 
 83 Presidential Decree RSS/PD/J/36/2012, 28.05.2012; Interview with Henry Swaka, Juba, 
10.04.2013; Tier 2013. 
 84 Presidential Decree RSS/PD/J/03/2012, 09.01.2012. 
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negotiations, civil society actors formed various citizens’ constitution-making fora85. 
They hoped that the actors at the official NCRC negotiation table would consider 
and integrate the outcomes and suggestions of the various CSO fora into the 
constitution-making process86. However, the influence of the few appointed NCRC 
members representing civil society and serving as voices for the people on the 
ground seems instead to have again been reduced to a ‘rubber stamp’, with their 
signatures becoming a formality in the face of the majority voting system.87 This 
situation only serves to increase tensions and potential conflicts, as many actors 
feel excluded despite all the efforts made to win a place at the negotiation table.88  
Over the course of last three years several conversations were held with the 
former head of the NCRC, the late Akolda M. Tier, to learn more about how the 
NCRC is negotiating a ‘supreme law of the land’ among the plurality of actors and 
how the institutional actors deal with the offered international ‘technical 
assistance’. When speaking with NCRC-chairperson during fieldwork in May 2015, 
his views regarding the production of a constitution had fundamentally changed: in 
2013, Akolda emphasised that ‘a constitution is an agreement between political 
parties’ to be drafted by legal experts with support of international expertise. It is a 
technocratic endeavour. Involving the common people at this early production 
stage would be time consuming and will cause confusion. There was a predominant 
notion of ‘we draft for the people’89. However, in 2015, the chairperson of the 
NCRC admitted: ‘constitution making is not a switch on switch off operation’90, it is 
not a ‘project’. Moreover, he seemed to be upset with a ‘market place’ situation in 
his office, where multiple international actors advertised their products, recipes 
and toolboxes91.  
3 The International Actors and their Constitution-Making Toolbox  
In the following, this international toolbox is opened and attention turned as to 
how the various technologies of governance produce normativity and what effects 
those technologies have in light of translation processes of the circulating models. 
In an inversion of proclaimed ideas of ‘local ownership’, the international rule of 
law frames seem to regulate South Sudan’s constitution making in a way that 
reduces the chances of integrating the various ideas on statehood from the 
segmented society. The normative frames rather guarantee that ‘donors’ have a 
                                                          
 85 Anticipating that the actual ‘permanent’ constitution process will be conducted in a rather 
exclusive manner similar to how it had been conducted during the TCRSS drafting, civil society 
actors are prepared partially to fill the gap by promoting a comprehensive dialogue. For 
example, they had already collected views in all former 10 states for inclusion in the 
constitution in 2012–13. About 1,200 citizens were consulted via focus groups—traditional 
authorities, women’s groups, youth groups, civil society, state assemblies, religious groups, 
MPs and local government actors. The findings were subsequently passed on to the NCRC.  
 86 Interview with Marekaje Lorna, Juba, 04.04.2013; 01.05.2013, 15.05.2015; Peter Gai Manyoun, 
Juba, 11.04.2013. 
 87 NCRC 2012. 
 88 See comprehensively Seidel and Sureau 2015. 
 89 Conversations with Akolda Ma’an Tier, NCRC, Juba, 03.04.2013; 03.05.2015. 
 90 NCRC 2014. 
 91 Conversation with Akolda Ma’an Tier, NCRC, Juba, 26.05.2015.  
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dominant influence in agenda setting and on designing ‘projects’. Even though local 
actors are forced to negotiate within the highly contested international normative 
frames, it will be shown, how dominant local actors utilise the internationalised 
constitution making as well as the pre-defined reference frame in the Transitional 
Constitution 2011 to secure their own interests and positions. 
South Sudan’s internationalised ‘post-conflict’ reconstruction efforts are part of 
the latest constitutional experimentation mentioned above. In order to make the 
experimentation successful, i.e. to ensure that certain normative ideas become the 
driving force for legal interventions, they need to be framed. Accordingly, the 
website of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) branch for South 
Sudan echoes the Grundnorm:  
The rule of law is the essential framework for security, economic 
growth and the provision of social services in South Sudan. It 
provides mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflicts, the 
certainty that allows the private sector to develop […], and access to 
justice that ensures respect for human rights […].92 
The constant affirmation of the RoL-frame seems to be a key governance 
technology to cultivate the Grundnorm93, and it seems to be legitimised and 
sustained by the powerful tool of taxonomies supported through indices. As 
mentioned above, in an attempt to relate the emerging state to the other 193 
states in the ‘community of nations’, the introduction of the model state of South 
Sudan was accompanied right from the start by reference to the commonly 
accepted set of global benchmarks: the indicators of statehood and rule of law. 
South Sudan heads up the list of ‘very high alert’ states.94 Those classifications are 
based on problematic premises: they ‘presuppose a collective identity, i.e. a 
fictitious entity comprising the entire “constitutive people”, for whom the state has 
failed’.95 The on-going violent and non-violent negotiations over statehood at 
different societal levels demonstrated that, to date, there has been no regional 
and certainly no national consensus on the mode of either statehood or of dealing 
with the many interests and claims.96  
When taking a closer look at the dominant international actors supporting the 
constitution-making process, it is clear that the provision of expertise ranges from 
individual and groupings of states, (supra-)regional institutions, non-local NGOs, 
commercial actors, research institutions and think tanks97. Not only ‘repeat players’ 
such as the United Nations (UN), United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), Department for International Development (DFID), International 
Development Law Organisation (IDLO), SwissPeace, but also pro-boni law firms, e.g. 
Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG) offer programmes, guidelines, 
                                                          
92  See UNDP, http://www.undp.org/content/dam/southsudan/library/Fact%20Sheets/UNDP-SS-
Rule-of-law-flyer.pdf. 
 93 May 2014a. 
 94 See Fragile States Index 2016. 
 95 Schlee cit. in Fenzel 2014: 23. 
 96 See comprehensively Seidel and Sureau 2015.  
 97 Turner 2015: 397.  
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‘good/best practices’. In order to limit competition among the international actors, 
some actors, specifically IDLO, UNMISS and PILPG managed to be explicitly named 
in a presidential decree.98 Moreover, IDLO’s legal experts obtained a seat at the 
NCRC negotiation table and provided comprehensive assistance, as an IDLO 
‘Briefing Note’99 demonstrates which brings the question of who owns the process 
on the fore.  
International actors use certain IT technologies as well as security technologies to 
provide their services. They offer access to legal databases and thereby standardise 
specific schemes of constitutionalism. Moreover, they promise to create ‘online 
public submission forms’ to gather public input. This tool belongs to the ‘best 
practices’ tested, for instance, during South Africa’s and Kenia’s constitution 
making. However, the applicability of those tools seems to be questionable in light 
of the very marginal internet access in South Sudan, even in the major cities.  
This demonstrates that South Sudan’s constitution making is an internationally 
designed product. However, the ongoing violent and non-violent re-negotiations 
demonstrate in no uncertain terms that neither the production of the pre-defined 
transitional constitutional arrangements of 2005 (Interim Constitution) and 2011 
(TCRSS), nor the efforts towards a ‘permanent’ constitution could establish a 
consolidated state actors’ legitimacy and the identity of the emerging state. 
Nevertheless, few dominant local political actors have already utilised the 
international tools. Thereby the TCRSS has become a perfect power instrument 
with unpredictable effects on the governmental arrangement. It shows severe 
unintended consequences that international ‘tools’ have co-created. For example, a 
constitutional amendment of 2015 not only extended the mandate of the National 
Constitutional Review Commission for another three years, but also the tenure of 
the president and the parliament100. The quickly drafted TCRSS, which is based on 
modules taken from the international constitution-making toolboxes, allowed 
predetermination of its numerous fundamental but unanswered questions 
regarding e.g. governmental structure or division of powers. The local translation 
dynamics become visible in the president’s excessive powers as enshrined in the 
constitution. Since 2012 President Salva Kiir has been using his ‘hyper-powers’ for 
his benefit, a consequence of the ‘turning point’ mentioned above. The president 
dismissed his Vice-President Riek Machar, his entire cabinet, and eight out of ten 
                                                          
 98 The National Constitution Review Commission, is ‘[…] to invite experts whenever required, to 
assist it in its work’ and ‘the secretariat may seek technical assistance from international 
partner organizations such as IDLO [International Development Law Organization], PILPG 
[Public International Law & Policy Group], UNMISS [United Nations Mission in the Republic of 
South Sudan] or any other organization as necessary’, see Art. 14 (7) Presidential Decree 
RSS/PD/J/02/2012, 21.01.2011. 
 99 The assistance comprised, for instance: to prepare the steps to be taken in the constitution 
making; to draft the decree to establish the NCRC; to prepare memo to the MoJ to give the 
president his strategy for the constitution process; to create concept notes on issues 
involving CSOs, public participation; to prepare talking points for the President’s speech at 
swearing in NCRC at the request of the President’s office; to provide support to the 
development of Rules and Procedures for the NCRC; to develop the NCRC Action Plan, etc. 
100 Government of South Sudan (GoSS) 2015. 
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state governors and appointed ‘caretakers’101, setting in motion severe political and 
military re-negotiations102 within the political negotiation arena.  
Already during the making of the Transitional Constitution the process was 
controlled by the Technical Constitutional Committee (TCC) mentioned above as 
appointed by the President at the beginning of 2011. About two-thirds of its 
members belonged to ruling party SPLM. This two-thirds majority was necessary to 
generate consensus according to the committee’s internal rules.103 These rules are 
taken from the international toolbox. The internal rules of the NCRC, which seem 
to be the amended TCC internal rules, follow the majority voting system as well.104  
The space for negotiating the production of the constitution is also narrowed by 
‘project law’105. To illustrate the challenges of those techniques, it is necessary to 
return to the ‘permanent constitution’ project.  
As far as the design of the project is concerned, it follows a four-stage 
constitution-making process according to international standardised procedures. 
The supporting tools, the 2009 guidance note on United Nations assistance to 
constitution-making processes and an attached template of the proposed process 
reflects the ‘standard’. The different negotiation tables are the NCRC, followed by 
a National Constitutional Conference (NCC)106 and the National Legislative Assembly 
(NLA) and the President. There is an inherent contradiction in the process 
proposed: the project design is an impediment to a citizens’ driven constitution 
‘since governmental actors debate rather among themselves not only in the 
NCRC’107. Any input from the citizens will occur during the NCC, the results will be 
decided afterwards in parliament by SPLM dominated politicians.  
Moreover, the ‘timeline’ has become an obstacle as well. The envisioned time 
frame for the ‘permanent’ constitution project of 2015 was obviously over-
                                                          
101 See Seidel and Sureau 2015. 
102 The major violent conflict was spreading at the end of 2013, which has caused more 10,000s 
lives and two million have been displaced. This time the conflict has been among South 
Sudanese political and military actors themselves. It began as a political power struggle within 
the ruling party SPLM (civil wing of the Army) and disputes over the party’s constitution-
making. These disagreements escalated in December 2013 and set in motion a conflict spiral 
in which the President Salva Kiir Mayardit and his former Vice-President Riek Machar, which 
the President Salva Kiir had removed from his position, became the main political and military 
opponents. But they are not the only protagonists in light of the fragmented military forces 
and authority structures. Since the beginning of 2014 regional/international actors have 
attempted to mediate and facilitate a ‘peace process’ in the neighbouring countries of South 
Sudan. Almost all efforts have failed to implement the formation of a so called ‘Transitional 
Government of National Unity’ agreed by the warring factions in 2015. 
103 Art. 10 (1) NCRC Internal Rules of Procedure 2012; Technical Committee 2011. 
104 NCRC 2012. 
105 Project laws are normative categories, hidden in standardised planning concepts, 
management techniques or general models at both project planning and implementing levels 
which aim for social change (see Weilenmann 2009; von Benda-Beckmann et al. 2009). 
106 The NCC will comprise delegates representing political parties, civil society organisations, 
women’s organisations, youth organisations, faith-based organisations, people with special 
needs, traditional leaders, etc. (Art. 203 (1) TRCSS). 
107 Interview with Edmond Yakani, Juba, 10.06.2015. 
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ambitious in light of two extension periods which have already taken the project to 
2018.108  
A closer examination of the structure and activities of the NCRC, based on the 
2009 UN guidance note, reveals that ‘procedural objectivities’109 are produced by 
the international partners through activity plans on how to produce a constitution. 
Within the constitution-making project, such plans and schedules determine what 
actions are viewed as necessary to achieve the goals, as well as the conditions, 
timing, and personnel involved. The NCRC Action Plan 2013/14 followed the UN 
guidance note and the attached example of a process, in terms of its general 
structure, activities, and timeline. Three components are involved in the sequence: 
1) civic education and public consultation proceedings; 2) constitutional review 
proceedings; 3) NCRC deliverables. Specific project management language is used 
as well, making particular use of procedural verbs, such as organise, execute, 
consult, recruit, create, and produce. This language reflects a linear process and 
objective procedures. 
Furthermore, the international concepts of ‘local ownership’ are ingrained in the 
plan. Regarding ‘national ownership’, ‘responsible actors’ (the NCRC) and 
‘implementing actors’ (international partners) are determined. However, activities 
relating to technical assistance and to special expertise are constructed the other 
way round; for instance, international actors such as IDLO and IFES (International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems) are responsible for creating public submission 
databases, providing thematic research conducted by sub-committees, recruiting 
thematic experts for research on South Sudan, producing comparative studies, 
recruiting experts on drafting constitutions, etc. Within the context of this division 
of labour, the question arises as to who actually owns the process.  
As far as the ‘popular ownership’ mentioned in the 2009 UN guidance note and in 
the TCRSS110 is concerned, the NCRC Activity Plan foresaw components such as 
‘civic education’ and ‘public consultation campaigns of about six months’. Following 
the Activity Plan schedule, the NCRC launched a civic education programme to 
involve the public in the ten states of South Sudan in the constitution-making 
process in July 2013. Due to the commission’s continuous lack of key resources, 
such as financial means and appropriate locations, and ‘due to a lack of political 
will’ as informants critically remarked111, the process floundered and the campaign 
was doomed to fail. Moreover, the December 2013 crisis ‘has increased such lack of 
funding, [has] limited the availability of technical support and has restricted the 
NCRC’s ability to continue implementing its civic education and public participation 
campaign due to security concerns’.112 The events of December 2013 can be 
regarded as another turning point in the constitution-making process. The 
commission was forced to stop the half-hearted civic education efforts as the major 
political actors turned to military re-negotiations. The violent political dynamics 
                                                          
108 TCRSS (Amendment Act 2013); TCRSS (Amendment Act 2015). 
109 Rottenburg 2009: 140. 
110 'The Constitution derives its authority from the will of the people', Art. 3 (1) TCRSS. 
111 Interview with G. N. Aciek, Juba University, Juba, 14.04.2013. 
112 IDEA 2014. 
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since 2013 have implications for constitution making since international actors 
have currently stopped supporting the process.  
4 A Constitution of ‘Zol Meskin’ [common people] in Light of the International  
 Toolboxes? 
It remains to be seen what impact the current political re-negotiations are having 
on the continuation of the constitution making. It is still an open question whether 
the participatory civic and public education will go beyond a mere awareness 
campaign on the official constitution making being conducted by the 
(inter)national elites.113 A general observation is the existence of problematic 
tensions between the ‘public ownership’ and the application of project 
management tools since the timetable was not sufficiently flexible to allow ideas 
which arise during the public consultations to be introduced and re-evaluated. As 
far as drafting of a ‘permanent’ constitution within the context of a highly 
segmented South Sudan is concerned, there is an obvious dilemma: on the one 
hand, the absence of a ‘nation’ or national ideas, and the predetermination of those 
ideas in the constitution. On the other hand, even though the modes of statehood 
are still under negotiation, the technical assistance and toolboxes provided by 
international actors regulate the constitution-making process in such a way that it 
reduces the chances of substantially assessing and integrating the interests of the 
different parts of the segmented society by simultaneously proclaiming ideas of 
national and popular ownership. The governmental political actors involved are 
prone to apply and redefine constitutional schemes and utilise guidelines according 
to their own needs. They effectively adapt their normative frameworks to 
international ones, or at least pretend to. As civil society actors have been 
relegated to a second tier of negotiations, they have established their own 
negotiation tables as they also wish to participate in the official state-making 
process.  
The political and, particularly since the end of 2013, the military re-negotiations 
reveal that the building blocks of a constitution are contested. South Sudanese 
actors need to reflect on the internal socio-political dynamics, the root causes of 
the ‘crisis’, and to negotiate on the fundamental issues to be written into the 
constitution.  
The so far ‘unsuccessfully’ conducted constitution-making process and the 
military-political re-negotiations seem to offer an opportunity for critical reflection 
on the constitution-making endeavour. Unless the process of drafting a 
constitution is radically rethought, the legitimacy of a constitution produced in this 
way would appear to be in jeopardy.  
The late NCRC chairperson emphasised in May 2015 the significance of civic 
engagement and questioned the chosen constitution-making design, which does 
not seem to fulfil the declared idea of a ‘peoples-driven’ constitution.114 In light of 
the proceedings which have not been conducted very ‘successfully’ so far, he wrote 
to the parliament:  
                                                          
113 See comprehensively Seidel and Sureau 2015. 
114 Conversation with Akolda Ma’an Tier, NCRC, Juba, 14.05.2015. 
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The constitutional making process could be a real basis and catalyst 
for a durable peace in the country; [a]cknowledging the need for the 
people of South Sudan to be given the opportunity in determining 
their socio-economic and political destiny through nationwide civic 
education, we strongly recommend that the mandate of the 
commission be extended for a period not less than three years 
subject for review when a permanent peace is realised in the 
country.115 
In the same vein, the latest Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the 
Republic of South Sudan (ARCRSS) which was negotiated and signed by the warring 
factions in August 2015 under pressure from the East African Community (EAC), the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the international 
community modified their previous approach to constitution making. In the 
amended roadmap, the guiding principles are expected to be local ownership and a 
comprehensive popular participation.116 
The constitution-making process, which has been extended to 2018, seems to be 
a first step towards being able to reflect the will of the people and to promote the 
idea of popular ownership. Maybe then, the plea of South Sudanese civil society 
actors promoting ‘The Constitution of Zol Meskin’ (Juba Arabic for ‘common 
person’) can become reality.  
IV Local Translations Without the International ‘Industry’: 
Constitution making in Somaliland 
Somaliland’s117 constitution-making experience, on the other hand, shows 
another picture. When Somaliland self-declared its independence on 18 May 1991, 
no reddish book was held up as symbol of the state, no government was in place, 
and no international actors with their toolboxes on how to produce a constitution 
were present. As will be shown, the Constitution of the Republic of Somaliland 2001 
is not a product of the internationalised constitution-making ‘industry’. Since 
Somaliland is de jure perceived as part of the Federal Republic of Somalia, the self-
declared Republic of Somaliland is neither part of the global experimentation field 
nor of any global taxonomy118. According to Mohamed Farah Hersi:  
They [international actors] don’t want to draft a constitution which is 
at the end of the day not compatible to the constitution of Somalia. A 
reason why the international community was more or less reluctant 
to support the constitution making was that they don’t know how the 
government system in Somaliland looks like as well as the 
                                                          
115 NCRC 2015. 
116 See Ch. VI ARCRSS. 
117 Internationally not recognised as a sovereign state, Somaliland is only regarded as an 
autonomous region of Somalia since 1991. 
118 For the ‘failed state debate’ see comprehensively Hagmann and Hoehne 2009: 42–57. 
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Somaliland’s constitution-making process is violating the territorial 
integrity of Somalia.119 
Consequently, Somaliland’s constitution making has been regarded as ‘an 
instance of endogamous state-building’ and had taken place ‘with extremely 
modest [international] technical and financial assistance’120. This self-constructed 
rather endogamous process as analysed here will demonstrate that ‘donors have 
not been able “to set the agenda” in as dominant a fashion as elsewhere’121. 
Furthermore, the agreement on the constitution ‘is a product of very complex 
negotiations between the executive and legislative branches of government, with 
limited participation and scrutiny’122. Studies have shown that ‘[s]ince 1991, 
Somaliland has been able to re-build a consensual system rooted in its own culture 
by combining imported institutions with informal notions of governance, […] an 
attempt to blend modern state institutions with its own cultural values’123. Even 
though this approach has been considered as ‘successful’124, it also presents 
challenges of a ‘locally’ led process in light of exclusion and inclusion dynamics, as 
will be shown. According to the Somaliland government’s own description of itself,  
[…] using indigenous peace-making procedures, the various 
Somaliland communities held a considerable number of local 
meetings and national conferences to re-establish the peace 
between the different communities and lay the foundations for local 
security and governance, in tandem with state building and national 
governance.125  
The establishment of negotiation tables for extended debates between the very 
fragmented political authorities were the predominant ‘indigenous’ peace- and 
state-making mechanisms or technologies within the political settlement. No less 
than ‘39 meetings and conferences took place at different scales between 1990 
and 1997 to restore the community relations after war, to establish a security 
regime, to establish local and national governance’126 and to agree on a constitution 
as the consensual foundation of the emerging state. Moreover, the establishment 
of ad hoc committees was the main tool used to put long-term meetings in place127. 
It is possible to identify precarious moments that occurred during constitution 
making at the many negotiation tables that had been established during the 
process and these reflect the changes in the course of the negotiations which 
lasted almost a decade. This paper will focus on four negotiation tables: three 
conferences at the national level (1991, 1993, 1997) and the popular referendum 
                                                          
119 Interview with Mohamed Farah Hersi, Hargeisa, 16.11.2016. 
120 Renders 2007: 441. 
121 Walls 2012: 71. 
122 APD 2004.  
123 Battera 2004: 17, 19. 
124 Healy 2010: 84; Gordon 1999: 528; Battera 2004: 18f. 
125  See Recognition Somaliland Government, http://recognition.somalilandgov.com/history/.  
126 APD 2008: 13. 
127 Interview with Mohamed Hassan Ibrahim, Hargeisa, 22.10.2015.  
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(2001) where the negotiations led to actual turning points. Light will be shed on 
ways in which the constitution was negotiated in the formal arena of the 
negotiation tables which were a central mechanism within the ‘traditional’ Somali 
conflict resolution mechanism. Therefore, despite all disputes and disagreements, 
mutual recognition among the participants can be regarded as crucial and has been 
supported to reach a consensus on the Somaliland Constitution of 2001.  
1 The Kick-Off: Burao Conference 
The Burao Conference (Grand Brotherhood Conference of Northern Clans128) of 
1991 can be regarded as the kick-off negotiation table for extensive peace building 
efforts, underpinned by constitution making129. Brokered by institutionalised clan 
authorities (guurti)130 and the SNM (Somali National Movement), this conference led 
to a historical caesura. The secession agreement in the form of a ‘declaration of the 
restoration of Somaliland sovereignty on 18 May, as well as the reconciliation in the 
Northern regions’131, represents a turning point in the many months of negotiations 
between the different clans and sub-clans. It led to the agreement of a two-year 
interim government led by the SNM132 which should have prepared the country for 
the transfer of power from the central committee of SNM, the establishment of 
political parties, elections and for a constitution. The SNM interim government, 
which was ‘mandated [by the guurti] for disarmament and constitution making’133, 
was not able to produce a transitional constitutional document (due to military re-
negotiations in the negotiation arena between Isaaq clans and former SNM, intra-
SNM conflicts134). However, a remarkable feature of Somaliland’s constitution-
making process is that the former liberation movement, the SNM, handed over 
power in 1993 to people who had never fought in the SNM. Therefore, the guurti 
‘which were not only crucial in this transition period, but throughout the 
constitution-making process, has been much more influential than the nascent 
government of Somaliland’135, ‘because we knew that is the only applicable and 
successful system which works’136. When taking a closer look into the involvement 
of international actors at the Burao negotiation table and during the two following 
years, it became obvious that Somaliland political actors negotiated rather 
                                                          
128 ‘Representatives of all the Northern clans, including politicians, diaspora, business people, 
poets, women, religious men and traditional elders attended, with nominated delegates 
participating in the formal proceedings’ (APD 2008: 32). 
129 Interview with Haroon Ahmed Yusuf, Hargeisa, 17.11.2015; Boobe Yusuf Duale, Hargeisa, 
27.10.2015. 
130 ‘A clan body [which] became mediation and reconciliation body for SNM … a tool of the 
movement [SNM] and the utilisation of the guurti made the traditional institution a part of 
the movement’s apparatus’. Since 1990 the guurti expanded their role to include all 
Somaliland clans it formally institutionalised into an SNM governing structure as a separate 
branch of leadership (see comprehensively Richards 2014).  
131 APD 2008: 37–40. 
132 These two years were guided by the SNM constitution of 1981; see Richards 2014.  
133 Interview with Abdil Qadir Jirde, Hargeisa, 28.10.2015.  
134 APD 2008: 41. 
135  Hoehne 2013: 204. 
136 Interview with Adan Abokor, Hargeisa, 12.11.2015. 
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amongst themselves. For example, in 1992, ‘a resolution [was] handed over to 
UNOSOM by the guurti requesting [military] non-interference to avoid the 
escalation of internal conflicts and widening the conflicts between the clan’137, but 
they were open to obtaining international support for ‘disarmament and 
demobilisation’138.   
2 Borama Conference Paves the Way: A National Charter for the transition 
 period  
The next ‘turning point’ was an agreement reached at the Borama Conference of 
the Somaliland Communities in 1993 where 150 official delegates and no less than 
500 observers took part139. Some minority clans were not represented, but a 
delegation of 17 women did attend140. At this conference, ‘everything was open; 
was put on the table’141. The Borama negotiation table is regarded as a ‘model of 
Somali negotiation, which tends to work on the basis that consensus’142 as well as a 
watershed in Somaliland’s constitution making and political reconstruction since 
the de jure transition from a military to a ‘civilian’ government. Besides 
reconciliation among the different (sub-)clans, negotiations revolved around the 
issue of a suitable system of government143. According to Boobe Yusuf Duale, a key 
issue was:  
[…] whether we take a parliamentary system, a presidential system, 
or a five-rotating presidents system. The people wanted to go for 
presidential system to have a fist which should unite from war. This 
Somali society, if you tell them the prime minister is more stronger 
than the president, they will never believe you.144  
After spending four months at the negotiation table, a Peace Charter as well as 
the Somaliland National Charter (Axdiga Qaranka) (NC)145 was agreed by the 
delegates under the aegis of the self-selected body guurti [which became 
‘constitutionally codified within the National Charter as a body with both legislative 
and traditional or cultural responsibilities within the hybrid government’146]. 
Previous analysis has shown that ‘there was a constant process of setting 
                                                          
137 Interview with Addilahi Ibrahim Hapane, Hargeisa, 18.11.2015. 
138 Interview with Abdirahman Aw Ali, Hargeisa, 01.11.2015. 
139 Hapane 2009: 30. 
140 ‘That group reiterated the position of UNOSOM stated in the lead-up meetings, supported 
the formation of a national guurti, and demanded a greater role in future conferences’ (APD 
2008: 49). Moreover, it is interesting to note, the pressure applied by women’s groups for a 
greater involvement in the political process did result in the appointment of Somaliland’s first 
female Minister. 
141 Interview with Mohamed Hassan Ibrahim, Hargeisa, 22.10.2015. 
142 APD 2008: 53. 
143  Ibid.: 51f. 
144 Interview with Boobe Yusuf Duale, Hargeisa, 27.10.2015; see also APD 2008: 53. 
145 APD 2008: 50–3. 
146 Richards 2014: 137f. 
Seidel  |  . . . Constitution Making in South Sudan and Somaliland . . . 
 
 
 
Global Cooperation Research Papers 18 25 
 
 
deadlines, putting pressure on groups and an immense amount of hard work by the 
various individuals and groups that took on mediation roles [… and] there were ad 
hoc groups, who through persistence and good will were able to convince 
antagonists of their trustworthiness and commitment’147.  
Accordingly, essential features of the five months negotiations were dynamic 
deadlines, mediation and behind-the-scenes lobbying148. 
Finally, the National Charter ‘laid the foundation for Somaliland’s stability and 
statehood’149 which was supposed to serve as constitutional document (Art. 5 NC) 
for an interim period of two years. The NC can be seen as the ‘forerunner to the 
constitution’150. It paved the way for the transition to a government rule and civilian 
administration151. 
Another crucial factor ‘was the lack of international intervention, which seems to 
have exercised a maligned influence on some of the critical peace and trust-
building processes’152. The absence of conditionalised ‘state-building’ assistance 
gave ‘more room for a pluralistic world with varying political communities with 
different norms and practices’153. However, the 1993 conference was supported by 
‘a combination of external but clan-based facilitation and logistic support. For 
instance, UNDP supplied air transport for delegates’154. The UNOSOM mission did 
not offer any support, whereas a number of foreign governments, INGOs and faith 
groups contributed155. ‘Some INGOs [were] supported via local NGOs’156, e.g. ‘for 
that conference we [SORRA] raised funds through the Swedish “Life and Peace 
Institute” and the US based Mennonites; all together 100,000 USD. Since the 
conference lasted for almost five months it was rather a drop in a bucket’.157 The 
(I)NGOs stayed away from the negotiation table, because ‘it would have been really 
not effective if we had interfered. It was effective, because they were doing it in 
the traditional way.’158 Decisions were therefore made by local actors and: ‘external 
funding did not disproportionally dominate, and outsiders did not establish 
frameworks and deadlines beyond the immediate release of funds’159. Since ‘there 
was no money at all, people were eating, and drinking, and coming to the 
conference, there was no per diem, or anything, people who came with their pocket 
money, or they asked their relatives in Europe or US to send money because they 
stayed long for the meeting’160. Moreover, ‘loans from the shops, the butchers, 
                                                          
147 APD 2008: 54. 
148 Ibid.: 55. 
149 Ibid. 2015: 16. 
150 Interview with Mohamed Seid Gees, Hargeisa, 17.11.2015. 
151 See Renders 2012: 118. 
152 APD 2008: 54. 
153 Osman 2013: 52f. 
154 APD 2008: 48. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Interview with Haroon Ahmed Yusuf, Hargeisa, 17.11.2015. 
157 Interview with Adan Abokor, Hargeisa, 12.11.2015; Addilahi Ibrhaim Hapane, Hargeisa, 
18.11.2015. 
158 Interview with Adan Abokor, Hargeisa, 12.11.2015. 
159 Walls 2012: 83. 
160 Interview with Abdirahman Aw Ali, Hargeisa, 01.11.2015. 
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from everybody’ were taken as well as ‘our diaspora [sent] money for us’161. Thus, 
the main funding for facilitating the conference was contributed by domestic and 
Somaliland diasporic actors through their specific initiatives and campaigns162.  
Adan Abokor comments on the main mechanism that led to the ‘success’ of the 
Borama Conference:  
[T]hat traditional mechanism was giving you time; you don’t rush 
things. […] There was no time frame, it continued, and continued, 
they were meeting days and days. When they had a hiccup, or a bottle 
neck, they stopped for a few days. The conference was not 
continuing for few days. Then the clans will go inside the same town 
and would go and have separate meetings. Then they go back, they 
had their own separate meetings and then they come with a 
resolution, with a reconciliation proposal. Then they reconcile and 
continue. They find a way to agree through consensus, because there 
was no voting, all was based on consensus.163 
3 The Troublesome Constitution-Drafting Processes  
The life of the National Charter needed to be extended beyond the agreed two 
years due partly to violent political (re-)negotiations among the political elites. The 
House of Representatives (HoR) was entitled to set-up a constitution drafting 
negotiation table (Art. 11T1B NC). Accordingly, early 1994 the HoR nominated an 
eleven-member National Preparatory Committee of Somaliland’s Constitution 
(constitutional committee) supposedly to reflect ‘the structure of the people’164. In 
response to the former president’s Mohammed H. Egal (1993–2000) dissatisfaction 
with the committee’s composition (the ‘parliament nominated itself’165), another 
20-member consultative body comprising legal experts, traditional and religious 
authorities and politicians was appointed166 to draft an Interim Constitution.  
The constitutional committee developed its own internal regulations, a work plan 
and a timetable167. The work plan foresaw a comprehensive public consultation 
process at district, regional and national levels168. The committee began a 
productive consultation process and influential clan elders, intellectuals, 
businessmen, professional groups, religious leaders as well as women discussed the 
major constitutional principles based on previous political history, such as debating 
                                                          
161 Interview with Abdirahman Aw Ali, Hargeisa, 01.11.2015. 
162 Interview with Addilahi Ibrhaim Hapane, Hargeisa, 18.11.15; Abdil Qadr Jirde, 28.10.15; Adan 
Abokor, 12.11.15; APD 2008: 47f. 
163 Interview with Adan Abokor, Hargeisa, 12.11.2015. 
164 National Preparatory Committee of Somaliland’s Constitution 1994. 
165 Interview with Addilahi Ibrahim Hapane, Hargeisa, 18.11.2015. 
166 National Preparatory Committee of Somaliland’s Constitution 1994. 
167 APD 2004: 4. 
168 National Preparatory Committee of Somaliland’s Constitution 1994, APD 2004: 4. 
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centralised versus decentralised approaches169 even though the necessary financial 
support was not granted by the president to implement the strategy in full170. 
Moreover, the work plan tasked the members of the committee to collect 
different sample constitutions ‘specifically those socio-economic[ally] comparable 
to our country as well as Islamic jurisprudence [… in order] to draft a document 
integrating the best elements of our traditional heritage, [I]slamic tenants, and 
principle features of plural democracy, bearing in mind that the moral ethos of our 
tradition is based on Islam […]’.171 ‘Members were travelling to neighbouring 
countries’172. According to Abdil Qadir Jirde, ‘[w]e asked our members to gather as 
much as they can’.173 The case studies include not only the former Somali 
constitutions of Somalia (1960 and 1979) and the SNM constitution, but also those 
of Ethiopia, Djibouti, Yemen, Uganda, Nigeria, Namibia, as well as from the India, 
United States and European countries such as France, UK and Germany174. 
Third, the work plan also reflects an agreement on seeking external expertise as 
well as support for finance and logistics.175 Since the former president Egal was not 
convinced by the committee’s performance, it is interesting to note that he 
advertised in the magazine The Economist mid-1990s ‘for a legal expert to draft a 
democratic constitution for a Muslim country’176 to assist the committee. The 
Sudanese constitutional expert Mohammed I. Khalil joined the negotiation table. 
Even though the presidential system had already been agreed in Borama and 
inscribed in the National Charter (which goes back to the SNM experience)177, 
severe disagreements arose between the President and the committee regarding 
assistance of the ‘foreign expert’178 and the concrete constitutional design.179 Since 
no compromise could be reached, Egal set up an extra small negotiation table in 
addition to the National Preparatory Committee who wanted to draft ‘a popular 
constitution with all the intent of the Somali, Islamic, and traditional culture’180. 
Egal entrusted the external expert to draw up a separate draft181. This political 
move can be considered as another ‘turning point’, setting in motion new 
negotiation dynamics. Egal shifted not only resources to the new negotiation table 
but also made sure that the draft ‘suits an executive president who has the powers 
of the president of the U.S.’.182 This increased the confrontation between the 
executive and legislative branch of government even further. Finally, two drafts, 
one by the committee and one by the external consultant, were produced based on 
                                                          
169 Interview with Mohamed Hussein Osman, Hargeisa, 19.11.2015. 
170 Interview with Mohamed Said Hersi, SOLLA, Hargeisa, 16.11.2015. 
171 National Preparatory Committee of Somaliland’s Constitution 1994. 
172 Interview with Mohamed Hussein Osman, Hargeisa, 19.11.2015. 
173 Interview with Abdil Qadir Jirde, Hargeisa, 28.10.2015. 
174 Ibid. 
175 National Preparatory Committee of Somaliland’s Constitution 1994. 
176 Interview with Mohamed Seid Gees, Hargeisa, 17.11.2015. 
177 See National Charter 1993; Interview with Abdirahman Aw Ali, 01.11.2015; Boobe Yusuf 
Duale, 27.10.2015. 
178 Interview with Mohamed Seid Gees, Hargeisa, 17.11.2015. 
179 Interview with Abdirahman Aw Ali, Hargeisa, 01.11.2015. 
180 Interview with Boobe Yusuf Duale, Hargeisa, 27.10.2015.  
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a presidential system, but the committee’s version advocated for a strong 
legislative branch, whereas ‘Egal’s draft’ favoured greater executive powers. The 
latter ‘created a “Monster” executive’ as described by Abdirahman Aw Ali Farah, 
Vice-President during that time (1993–97)183. 
4 Reconciling Constitutional Ideas: Around the Hargeisa Conference  
The Hargeisa Grand Conference of the Somaliland Communities of 1997 was the 
next negotiation table, not only set up to deal with the renewal of violent conflicts 
but also with the deadlock between the President and the Parliament over the 
formation of the ‘permanent’ constitution. At this negotiation table, the 315 voting 
delegates ‘finalized the reconciliation after internal military fighting between the 
government and fighting factions of some clans (1994–96)’184 and came up with a 
new draft of the Somaliland Interim Constitution (IC), the next ‘turning point’. In a 
process involving heated political debates in the government and in the media, the 
two constitutional drafts were moulded into the Somaliland Interim Constitution of 
1997 within four months185 by a 15-member committee selected from the 
delegates.186 Since the committee members ‘were hand-picked by the president 
Egal’, he could secure a degree of control over the process187. The IC was intended 
to serve for three years, at which point a ‘permanent’ constitution was supposed to 
be decided on by a popular referendum. Analysis has shown that ‘the establishment 
of the new government structure signalled the beginning of the political 
displacement of the clan elders as independent, pivotal political actors’.188  
The task of the newly-established committee for drafting the constitution was to 
reconcile legislative and executive sentiments: ‘We, the fifteen of us came up with 
a compromise. We adopted some articles from this side and some articles form that 
side’189, ‘with 2/3 majority for each article’190. Some major contentious issues such as 
identity or nationality, role of religion and Islamic law, and decentralisation191 
needed to be compromised. As it was predominantly a political compromise, the 
fusion of the two drafts, based mainly on the detailed legislative draft, did not 
satisfy the president’s expectations in terms of division of powers between the 
legislative and the executive branches and neither did the Islamic connotation of 
the constitution.192 Significant negotiations were once again required until finally 
another ad hoc committee was established, the joint 24-member The Constitution 
Revision Committee of both the House of Representatives and the House of Elders. At 
                                                          
183 Interview with Abdirahman Aw Ali, Hargeisa, 01.11.2015. 
184  Interview with Adan Abokor, Hargeisa, 12.11.2015. 
185 Interview with Mohamed Seid Gees, Hargeisa, 17.11.2015; Mohamed Hussein Osman, 
Hargeisa, 19.11.2015.  
186 Interview with Addilahi Ibrahim Hapane, Hargeisa, 24.10.2015; Mohamed Hussein Osman, 
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190 Interview with Mohamed Seid Gees, Hargeisa, 17.10.2015. 
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this last constitution drafting negotiation table, additional amendments of the 
Interim Constitution were negotiated and finally approved before leaving the final 
approval to a ‘popular referendum’.  
When taking a closer look at the external actors to be found at the negotiation 
tables around the Hargeisa conference, only the Sudanese expert had an actual 
seat at the table. Beyond the negotiation table, legal support came from the 
European diaspora network through comments on the different constitutional 
drafts.193 Not only the diaspora, also the business community also supported the 
government financially and became a stabilising factor in the early 1990s194. Alex 
De Waal commented once that Somaliland emerged as a business deal (a profit-
sharing agreement among the dominant livestock traders), with a constitution 
attached195. Both, the business and the religious communities196 supported the 
parliament during the disagreements between the executive and legislative 
branches when the president shifted resources towards the Sudanese expert197. 
Even though those ‘donors’ were not directly sitting at the negotiation table, they 
pushed certain ideas, which can be seen in, for example, a system of a free market 
economy or The House of Elders [guurti] and The Ulema Council198 enshrined in the 
constitution199.  
It is interesting to note that even though the constitution-making process was 
‘home-made’, it was also inspired by and interrelated to regional and global 
political dynamics200; in particular, the ‘failing’ peace and state building efforts in 
Somalia, which were massively brokered and assisted by the international 
community201. By affirmatively pointing the finger to ‘the brother Mogadishu we 
don’t want to be’, their own identity was constantly reassured. Global events left 
their mark on the document as well, e.g. ‘in the previous constitution there was a 
clause: the two Houses need to vote on the impeachment of the president. It was 
when the former US president Clinton was under impeachment [Monica Lewinsky 
affair]. So they took the system of the Americans.’202  
With regard to the lack of direct international influence, Abdil Qadir Jirde, 
member of the Constitution Preparation Committee comments: 
We had to go to the internet, talk to people, collect as many as 
constitutions as possible, from Islamic countries, from Pakistan, 
Yemen, Egypt, and from the region, from Europe. So it was not 
organised well. We would have admired a consultant. But, whenever 
there is funding from the outside or from U.S., I am not an advocate 
of a person holding the agenda. This changes now here. I remember 
                                                          
193 Interview with Mohamed Hussein Osman, Hargeisa, 19.11.2015. 
194 Conversation with Mark Bradbury, Hargeisa, 27.10.2015. 
195 De Waal 2003. 
196 Interview with Mohamed Seid Gees, Hargeisa 17.11.2015; Mark Bradbury, Hargeisa, 27.10.2015. 
197 Interview with Mohamed Hussein Osman, Hargeisa, 19.11.2015. 
198 Ibid.; Interview with Addilahi Ibrahim Hapane, Hargeisa, 18.11.2015. 
199 See Preamble, Art. 11, 57–79, 115, Constitution of the Republic of Somaliland. 
200 Interview with Mohamed Hussein Osman, Hargeisa, 19.11.2015. 
201 See Walls 2012: 79–81.  
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what was happening in Southern Sudan, too many, too many experts 
[…].203 
Before looking in more detail at the exclusion dynamics at the negotiation tables, 
the last ‘turning point’ which was crucial for reshaping the constitution-making 
dynamics should be addressed. After a decade of combination of political and 
military (re-)negotiations, the Constitution of the Somaliland Republic was 
overwhelmingly approved in a nationwide popular referendum held on 31 May 
2001. According to the Somaliland government, 97.7 per cent of the 1.19 million 
voting people approved the constitution204. The people de facto voted on the 
secession clause (Art. 1 of the Constitution). It was a de facto referendum on 
‘sovereignty’, on Somaliland’s independence205. Thus, the approved constitution not 
only established a legal framework for the structure of governance, but also 
‘legalised the existence of a state called Somaliland’206. The setup of the final 
crucial negotiation table was guided by the political actors in power: they 
stipulated that anyone who is against the constitution is ultimately negating the 
idea of the existence of the Republic of Somaliland.207  
There was some kind of a campaign that has branched through all 
sources of the media, and the media institutions that the people 
voting for the constitution are recognizing the identity and the 
existence of Somaliland. [However, the] referendum did not reach 
the disputed areas.208  
The people were familiarised with the constitution through oral and written 
media. The media covered the process and the people involved as well as the 
respective constitutional stipulations were published and discussed.209 The 
referendum was boycotted in Eastern parts of Somaliland210 and various opposing 
forces campaigned against the constitution (e.g. some religious actors as well as 
political groups who pleaded for an extension of the Interim Constitution) as they 
saw a lot of unresolved critical issues in the final document of the CSR and objected 
to the powers given to the executive branch of government. Civil society actors 
also complained about the lack of public consultation during the drafting 
process211:  
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The public was given too little time to grasp the issues and discuss 
cogently the draft constitution, which they considered flawed in 
some fundamental respect […] and accusing the government of 
playing on the public’s strong support for independence, when in fact 
it should have given a fair chance for public acceptance or rejection 
of the constitution.212  
Due to the specific political dynamics the constitution making was rather 
government driven, lacking public input and therefore genuine legitimacy213. 
5 Local Exclusion Dynamics: Where are the voices of more than half of the 
 population? 
The political bargaining did not seem to leave much space for civil society actors, 
women, minority groups214 and opposition215 in the constitution-making process. 
Specifically on the issue of the exclusion-inclusion dynamics of women, Haroon 
Yusuf commented:  
Women were not consulted and that is why it [the constitution] is not 
gender sensitive and it talks vaguely about men and women equality. 
It does emphasise the need for capacity building and the role of 
women in the national processes, in leadership.216 
The lack of women at the constitution-making negotiation tables217 seems to be 
closely tied to the fact ‘it were only men who could take part in the clan affairs and 
in the conflict resolutions’.218 A Somali saying reflects this: Dumar quabiina naaha. It 
implies that women do not belong to any clan as their loyalty is torn between their 
father’s and there husband’s clan219: therefore, ‘[s]ince the conferences were based 
on clan power sharing, each sub-clan was asked to bring a certain number of 
delegates to the conference; no clan would bring a woman to the conference’.220 
However, even though women were not directly invited to join the various 
conferences, they negotiated away from and beyond the negotiation tables as the 
following contributors have described:  
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[W]omen from 1991 onwards were always influencing and supporting 
reconciliation, they were always the wheels behind it, mobilising 
elders, because women are always the first ones to be affected by 
war, the first victims.221 
[W]omen were the one preparing the venue, cooking food, 
contributing ideas, collecting money, all the logistic support.222 
To strengthen the voice of women and ‘to contribute to the development of the 
country’223, some women’s activists had already started to institutionalise 
themselves in 1991, motivated by the desire to be part of the official process of 
peace, state and constitution making:  
Women came together and said it is time for us to push the agenda 
forward. They contacted the government and said women’s role is 
missing. We are the majority of Somaliland’s society […]. They 
prepared a statement submitted to the House of Elders in 1993 
demanding seats […].224  
Even though they were granted only a few seats by the House of Elders, Amina 
Milgo Warsame remembers: ‘we sat there, listened there, but had no participation, 
and at the end, they just read the piece of paper saying that we are also citizens of 
Somaliland and we have to take part’225. Since women were also not invited to the 
1997 Hargeisa conference, they again sent a written complaint to the President 
and to the guurti226.  
[We] requested fifty per cent share at Hargeisa conference, but they 
granted only six observer status slots. Long discussions whether to 
boycott the conference, but if we refuse to attend the meeting then 
nobody will talk about the women’s issues.227 
‘The constitution making went without women’228, even though we requested a 
women’s quota in parliament, specific women rights and protection from harmful 
cultural practices such as FGM229. Accordingly,  
[t]hey did advocacy, and mostly they were behind the decision 
makers, they were compelling the men to decide on peace 
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agreements. They were the backbones. […] they were suggesting as 
a group for their ideas.230  
The main means of mobilisation the (urban) women’s network used to influence 
the process were organising demonstrations, submitting written declarations to 
the conference delegates to sign an unconditional peace agreement231 and utilising 
personal contacts and family ties to influential members of the constitutional 
preparatory committee 1997232. 
6 No International Constitution-Making Toolbox 
When considering the lack of international intervention, the following anecdote 
illustrates the dilemma the emerging state faced in the 1990s: President M. Egal 
told a British MP in Hargeisa in 1993, ‘How can a local NGO [ActionAid] invite you to 
my country? I am the president of this country’. Haroon Ahmed Yusuf who was 
present during this conversation commented:  
Even though Egal was rebuilding the government, he did not have 
funds and he knew […] all the international money was going into 
INGOs, local NGOs, civil society groups, but nothing to the 
government. And he had to rebuild these institutions. It was his point 
that don’t you recognise me and give me funds to my government 
rather than NGOs.233 
It is therefore possible to say that, on the one hand, this situation unintentionally 
granted Somaliland’s actors space to negotiate their ‘own’ way of governance as no 
blueprints were available.  
Abdulrahman Aw Ali (Former Vice-President) emphasised the local dispute 
mechanisms:  
We resorted it in our traditional way of peace making. Somalis have 
been always warrior, always disputing, have conflicts with each other, 
but they always solve their problems by their own without external 
or foreign elements.234 
Mohamed Farah Hersi (Director Academy for Peace and Development): 
If external actors were directly involved, the way it was drafted 
would not have been the same… not only in terms of legitimacy, but 
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in terms of how you manage the process and how at the same time 
get what you want […].235 
Abdil Qadir H. Ismail Jirde (MP, Committee of Provisional Constitution of 1996): 
Somaliland has been lucky in the sense that we were ignored by the 
international community at the stage we were setting up… Because 
there were no blueprints. But we missed that. But at least the 
mistakes are ours and we can live with our mistakes. But now, I am 
very much frightened, because any reform we do now, is coming 
through aid agencies…it becomes aid driven.236 
On the other hand, local actors seemed to want supplementary support, as the 
following statements illustrate:  
We did not object their [international community’s] involvement, but 
everybody was interested in Somalia per se, but there was no interest 
in Somaliland. It was a blessing in disguise, because nobody 
interfered. It is ironic. Those days we were very bitter with the 
international community. We asked for support, but nobody was 
interested.237 
It was a blessing that they [international community] were not 
involved in the peace and reconciliations of Somaliland. But the 
international community support was very important during the 
democratisation process, that is what Somaliland really needed in 
terms of technical and financial they have supported.238 
Somaliland had a lot of external support, but I think without 
interfering in the local process, but supporting local capacities... 
through the support of international NGOs.239  
During the struggle for political participation, especially the marginalised 
women’s activists wished they had more international support:  
We wish that there was some kind of support. Of course we did not 
want, they dictate everything, but they should have facilitated 
somehow, the process that women knew what to expect, about 
Human Rights. Everybody was preoccupied with peace, settling down 
and nobody saw the importance of women. If we had known at that 
time, maybe we could have put some professionals there, because it 
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would be very difficult for women to participate in politics, because 
of the culture, the tradition.240  
The support from international community was only for income 
generation, education. […] Financial support and training are crucial 
in the area of women’s political participation. There were a lot of 
candidates, but no funds for campaigns. We need the international 
community to support the candidates.241 
The statements demonstrate that the lack of international support was mostly 
seen as a ‘blessing in a disguise’. Even though informants constantly pleaded for 
provision of technical and financial support they were aware that support is always 
fused with interests that need to be negotiated242. Particularly, international 
assistance is currently required ‘[…] for dealing with the current gaps in the 
constitution’243. Many inconsistencies and contradictions become visible with 
respect to ‘political structure; power distribution and responsibilities of the 
parliament, of the lower and the upper house; the power of the president, 
independency of the judiciary the composition of the judicial committee as well as 
the enshrined Bill of Rights’244. ‘Many [constitutional] articles specify laws to be 
promulgated which are still missing. It is not a deficiency of the constitution; it is 
the deficiency of the parliament, of the government’245. This last quote illustrates 
the current status quo and the awareness of the necessity of international 
assistance: 
The locally driven constitution making was good to find a consensus 
on basic building blocks, but later to deal with diversity or the 
different normative layers, international support is definitively 
needed. We need to sustain our people’s aspiration, and to give 
future prospective to the young generations at least… to catch up 
with the entire world which is now a global one.246 
Finally, it is possible to say that the constitution-making process in Somaliland 
shows an innovative approach in terms of developing national mechanisms, 
dialogue and an approach to mediation. However, the question remains how to 
proceed from here? The paradoxical ‘blessing in a disguise’ mentioned above 
illustrates that the general question remains: what kind of ‘assistance’ can the 
international community provide? How to avoid being trapped in the ‘aid driven’ 
(liberal) approach to state building? These questions will be addressed in the 
following section and compared to the contrasting experience of South Sudan. 
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V Conclusion: What can be learnt from both cases  
This comparative study once again validates the scepticism around the way in 
which internationalised constitution making in war-torn settings is conducted. The 
South Sudanese case shows that attempts to produce a ‘supreme law of the land’ 
out of pre-defined international concepts, modules and templates are misleading. 
Furthermore, a paternalistic attitude of international actors in the form of a ‘care 
and control mixture’247  seems to prevail, despite proclaimed ‘local ownership’. 
There is a conceptual dilemma between the idea of ‘public ownership’ and the 
project management tools utilised with their convincing logic of ‘objective 
procedures’. The South Sudanese actors in the institutionalised fora negotiate 
within the normative frames of the international actors. Even though the process 
of drafting a constitution is exposed to immense political pressure and directly 
associated with state-building efforts, the provisions of the transitional 
constitution themselves have already become an obstacle in the quest for ‘legal 
certainty’, ‘stability’ and ‘peace’. The Transitional Constitution does not take into 
account that, in emerging states, numerous issues to be written into the 
constitution will be contested by a multitude of actors with different claims. 
Acknowledging some of these claims while de jure regulating disputes through 
legal provisions impedes ongoing negotiation processes and intensifies rather than 
resolves conflict dynamics. The international ‘tool sets’ as well as the contested 
issues inscribed in South Sudan’s Transitional Constitution have therefore already 
become powerful weapons in the hands of a few dominant local actors for them to 
secure their own interests as ‘local ownership’ becomes a legitimising tool. Thus, 
the translation process demonstrates that the localisation dynamics are controlled 
by local politics and the ‘translation results’ seem to be contrary to intended Rule 
of Law ideas. In light of local political dynamics and translation processes, the de 
facto influence of well-intended international interventions seems rather limited.  
The Somaliland case clearly indicates that what matters is the process by which a 
constitution is actually drafted. In order to secure sustainable consensus building in 
a specific local setting, ‘owning’ the process seems to be a precondition for gaining 
legitimacy. However, the Somaliland case also demonstrates that a constitutional 
draft as a legitimising power tool has been created by inviting external actors to 
provide it. Nevertheless, a significant difference to the international toolbox 
provided in the South Sudanese case is that in Somaliland the tool produced by an 
external actor had been contested and re-negotiated in light of the alternative 
draft which had been produced locally.  
A procedural difference related to the intervention thus becomes apparent when 
comparing the two cases: ‘What is important is how you create that consensus 
building, and how you create the ownership, and how you create legitimacy’248. 
Accordingly, in Somaliland ‘the constitution making was a reconciling attempt 
rather than a drafting of a constitution’.249 Consensus production and decision 
making mechanisms were in the hands of Somaliland’s elites during the process 
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which lasted almost a decade, whereas in South Sudan the consensus production 
has thus far been framed and guided by the powerful international actors who had 
a seat at the local negotiation table. Their pre-determined international toolboxes 
do not take local context into account to any great extent. International actors try 
to produce quick, yet unsustainable ‘results’ though the support of ‘project law’. 
The internal logic and the proposed process steps laid out a priori limit the variety 
of modes of possible ‘technical assistance’ and the ability to rethink a chosen 
assistance, including the frame or the tools such as taxonomies and project law. 
This path dependence prevents such fundamental questions as ‘to what mode of 
statehood the South Sudanese people aspire’ being addressed. This is exemplified 
by the way the South Sudanese constitutional arrangements have been produced 
so far. Not only has the Technical Commission merely ‘reviewed’ the Interim 
Constitution of 2005, but the NCRC had a mandate only to ‘review’ the Transitional 
Constitution of 2011 instead of ‘rewriting’ the documents, as well. This inherently 
avoids a broader consensus production. The Somaliland example shows that Somali 
political actors have started to compose a constitution from scratch by negotiating 
the general political design of the state. A severe challenge here is that the 
international ‘prescriptions’ of how to produce a constitution perceive emerging 
South Sudan as a ‘re-construction’ state instead of a ‘construction state’ without 
embedding as many of the de facto functionary elites as possible. The ‘state 
centred’ and ‘top down’ recipes do not take other powerful actors, including the 
fragmented traditional or religious authorities, into account to any great degree; 
similarly, they are not flexible enough to take the ‘emerging’ nature of the state as 
a starting point in which the constellations of political actors are changing during 
negotiations. The actors are in a constant state of disagreement over the issue of 
who is or is not seated at the negotiation table. The constitution making conducted 
thus far in South Sudan is therefore not a ‘local’ product but rather part of the 
internationalised constitution-making ‘industry’; it has not as yet been possible to 
reach an agreement on sustainable conflict resolution mechanisms. 
Moreover, as far as the international actors are concerned, they are advertising 
their own products or solutions without taking the specific local political culture 
and socio-political/historical constellations as starting points. The critique to be 
vested on the side of the respective dominant national actors, they take the 
international ‘products’ for their own purposes and benefits as the reality on the 
ground indicates. This is exemplified in both the South Sudan and Somaliland cases 
where external actors ‘produced’ constitutional drafts out of a toolbox in 
accordance with the desires of the ‘customer’. Finally, what ‘local actors’ accept, 
adopt and appropriate from the international ‘tools’ very much depends on 
whether the ‘offer’ strengthens their own position. This becomes visible in the 
negotiation on the constitutionally enshrined comprehensive powers of the 
president in both countries in this study.  
Hence, it can be argued, that even the inherently existing tension between ‘local 
ownership’ and ‘external intervention’ can be productive since it provides space for 
re-negotiations on different forms of normativity. It may support redefining 
exclusion and inclusion dynamics, as the Somaliland case suggests, which was not 
very participatory beyond the political elites as demonstrated by the exclusion 
dynamics of women or ‘minority’ clans. However, the process needs to be 
conducted in an open manner by the local actors themselves in order to avoid 
Seidel  |  . . . Constitution Making in South Sudan and Somaliland . . . 
 
 
 
Global Cooperation Research Papers 18 38 
 
 
these tensions becoming ‘un-negotiable’ due to an imposed ‘assistance’ approach, 
which only leads to external ‘models’ being rejected or manipulated according to 
internal power relations.  
This study indicates that, generally, only a locally driven approach can take into 
account the fact that constitution making is navigated and patterned by the 
constellations and practices of specific plural actors and is thereby continuously 
transformed through negotiations and regulations in a specific local setting. Too 
often the assistance of the international community is not based on reality as the 
South Sudanese case has demonstrated. ‘Too often the aspect of legitimacy is 
lacking.’250 The locally driven and owned process in Somaliland supported the 
production of a legitimate end-product, the constitution, ‘because the people felt 
ownership’251. Agreeing with M.H. Osman, the ‘major pillar of the constitution has 
to come from within, based and reflected on historical, socio-political and economic 
situation’252. Moreover, agreeing with M.F. Hersi,  
‘[o]wnership and legitimacy are interrelated concepts. You have to 
have ownership of that document and process in order to have the 
legitimacy. Legitimacy is the outcome of ownership. If you don’t own 
the process you don’t have legitimacy’.253 
This study therefore suggests that the international recipes of the well-
intentioned constitutional assistance need to be fundamentally reconsidered in 
light of the many unintended consequences within the translation processes in 
war-torn contexts.  
It is possible to imagine sustainable international involvement under certain a 
priori conditions: it is essential to have the agreement or approval of all actors at 
the negotiation table in order to reach acceptance of the negotiation results, i.e. 
legitimacy of the consensus (Einigung). Moreover, another pre-condition is to 
develop a structural, self-reflective approach which deconstructs the baggage 
associated with international interventions, namely the hegemonic grid of 
concepts, research techniques, professional ethics, politics, as well as to examine in 
detail the (asymmetrical) political implications and interests. Hence, the 
international contribution to constitution making might instead be limited to 
sharing experiences, to focusing on common global challenges, and to balancing 
theory and reality, which requires a consequently procedural but not a managerial 
‘project’ approach. This approach could contribute to the mutual discovery of a 
spectrum of potential ‘solutions’. A precondition is not to rely on an approach 
which involves specified ‘best’ or ‘good’ practices and dominant ‘project law’, as an 
appropriate ‘option’ in one context can be inappropriate in another. Finally, the 
dictum might be: do not pre-design for ‘domestic actors’, support them in finding 
their own appropriate process and (socio-historical) design.  
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